نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استادیار گروه معارف دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان، ایران.
2 دانشیار گروه فلسفة دین. دانشگاه تهران. تهران. ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In his exposition of the Divine attributes—particularly the attributes of Will (irāda), Life (ḥayāt), and Power (qudra)—Ibn Sīnā, while affirming the meaningfulness of these attributes and making a serious effort to clarify their meanings, nonetheless analyzes them in such a way that leads to the conclusion that these attributes are equivocal (mushtarak lafẓī) between God and humans. In seeking the cause of such a position, two possible explanations arise.
The first relates to Ibn Sīnā’s position that the existence of God is entirely distinct (bā'in) from that of His creatures. However, after examining the relevant positions of the Shaykh al-Raʾīs, it becomes evident that this explanation cannot adequately account for his tendency to affirm the equivocality of the three aforementioned Divine attributes.
The second possibility pertains to the domain of semantics. In light of Ibn Sīnā’s approach to defining both Divine and human attributes, it becomes apparent that this semantic factor may indeed serve as a viable explanation for his inclination toward the position of equivocality. Nonetheless, his approach and its implications suffer from serious problems. Thus, two main objections are raised against his view: the conflation of concept (mafhūm) and referent (miṣdāq), and the consequent rendering of all attributes as equivocal.
Finally, it is emphasized that the meaningfulness of the Divine attributes (ṣifāt al-wājib) in Ibn Sīnā’s system can only be adequately justified through the acceptance of a specific gradational multiplicity (tashkīk khāṣṣ). Otherwise, his statements on this matter must be regarded as insufficiently clarified.
کلیدواژهها [English]