نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار منطق، گروه منطق، مؤسّسۀ پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفۀ ایران، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The relationship of logical consequence can be understood through at least two primary perspectives: proof-theoretic and model-theoretic. From a proof-theoretic standpoint, the existence of a proof that derives a conclusion from premises indicates that the conclusion is a logical consequence of those premises. In contrast, the model-theoretic perspective posits that if a conclusion holds true in every scenario where all the premises are true, then the conclusion is deemed a logical consequence of the premises. This article first delineates the perspective of Muslim logicians regarding logical consequence as a variant of proof-theoretic analysis. Subsequently, it addresses the fact that proof-theoretic analysis is predominantly endorsed by proponents of anti-realism. The article endeavors to elucidate how the realist stance of Muslim logicians can be reconciled with their adoption of proof-theoretic analysis of logical consequence. Based on this research, it is posited that the Muslim logicians' view of logic—as comprising self-evident principles and rules—along with their realist perspective on knowledge, allows for the acceptance of a proof-theoretic account of logical consequence to be compatible with metaphysical realism. In this framework, logic delineates the logical consequences of premises according to its rules of inference, which are either self-evident or derived from self-evident principles. Consequently, the conclusions drawn from valid logical arguments align with an independent reality, thereby affirming their truth.
کلیدواژهها [English]