نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسنده
دکترای فلسفه دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The explanation of the possibility of the reality of the primary intelligibles in the realm of habitual intelligence is an important epistemological issue. Two perspectives on explaining this matter are noteworthy: first, the speculative intellect at the level of habitual intelligence possesses the primary (non-acquired) intelligibles, and these intelligibles themselves (independent of anything external to the intellect) are valid. Second, verifying the reality of the primary intelligibles is not possible without relying on presential sensory perception. In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, this dependence has been emphasized more in the discussion of the "levels of speculative intellect." However, in the reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemology, attention has generally been paid to expressions that demonstrate the independence of the intellect from the senses or any matter external to the intellect. In the forthcoming paper, after expounding and criticizing the first perspective, we will show that Avicenna's views support the second perspective. Any kind of reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemological perspective in this regard, without considering his views on the "levels of speculative intellect" and the intellect's dependence on presential sensory perception, is not in line with his perspective. In general, according to the selected perspective, "sense intuition" is the first psychical reality to which the self is connected. The prior connection of the self to the psychical reality is the origin of actualization and the basis of the validity of the primary intelligibles; therefore, the speculative intellect relies on presential sensory perception while being independent in other respects.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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