Document Type : Scholarly Article
Author
Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies, Ahv.C. Islamic Azad University,Ahvaz, Iran.
10.30497/ap.2026.251625.1821
Abstract
Moral responsibility is a concept that moral philosophy has never done without in any period, yet the question of "where and how the moral subject becomes responsible" has been answered differently in various intellectual traditions. Using an analytic and comparative method, this paper juxtaposes two relatively distant models: Ibn Sina's rational-agentive model, which regards moral responsibility as the confluence of three pillars—will and free choice, power and ability, and knowledge and awareness—and grounds it in a self-aware, autonomous, and capable subject; and Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenological-passive model, which treats responsibility not as the achievement of the subject's conscious choice but as an antecedent, imposed event arising from the encounter with the face of the Other, placing the subject in the position of the Other's substitute and hostage. Although these two systems are far apart in time, language, and intellectual tradition, a comparative examination shows that both, from two completely different angles, grapple with a shared question: the relation between the self-grounding of the moral subject and an obligation that seems to be imposed on it from outside. Pursuing this question along axes such as the status of the "Other," the epistemological basis of responsibility, responsibility before God, and the limits and scope of responsibility, the article concludes that Ibn Sina's theory is considerably strong in explaining the rational structure and conditions of the possibility of responsibility, but struggles to account for unconditional and self-sacrificial responsibilities. By contrast, Levinas explains the unconditional, affective, and pre-rational aspect of responsibility, but cannot determine the place of the subject's will, free choice, and moral personality. Accordingly, the article proposes a two-dimensional model of moral responsibility in which the Ibn Sinaian rational-volitional dimension, as the condition of the possibility of responsibility, and the Levinasian affective-passive dimension, as its motive and ultimate horizon, are regarded as complementary.
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