Revisiting the Concept of Ittifāq (Chance) in Peripatetic Philosophy on the Basis of Fayż Lāhījī’s Views

The concept of ittifāq (chance) in Islamic philosophy—particularly within the Peripatetic (mashshāʾī) tradition—has been the subject of careful philosophical investigation. Fayż Lāhījī, by returning to the views of Aristotle and Avicenna, takes a critical stance against the interpretations of later Peripatetics and seeks to revive an authentic Peripatetic reading of this notion. This issue is closely tied to causality and teleology, and carries significant implications for understanding the meaning of life. Centered on Lāhījī’s perspective, this article pursues two aims: first, to re-examine and critique later Peripatetic interpretations of ittifāq; and second, to clarify Avicenna’s role as Lāhījī’s point of reference in returning to an Aristotelian approach. The study further shows how this re-reading reshapes the philosophical understanding of final cause and accident. Adopting an analytical–comparative method, the research first surveys the views of Peripatetics—from Aristotle to al-Fārābī and Avicenna—on ittifāq, and then analyzes Lāhījī’s critique of later figures and his defense of Avicenna. In this regard, particular attention is given to Avicenna’s fundamental distinction between the “essential cause” (sabab bi-al-dhāt) and the “accidental cause” (sabab bi-al-ʿaraḍ), illustrated through examples such as “digging a well and unexpectedly finding treasure.” Findings indicate that, following Avicenna, Lāhījī does not regard ittifāq as something devoid of cause, but rather as an occurrence that takes place under the shadow of the accidental cause and within the framework of final causality. This Aristotelian–Avicennian interpretation is set in contrast to the positions of later Peripatetics, who, in Lāhījī’s view, had departed from the original meaning. The study also demonstrates that returning to Avicenna’s account not only resolves conceptual ambiguities surrounding ittifāq, but also forges a deeper connection between causality, teleology, and the meaning of life.



Lahiji maintains that seemingly accidental occurrences are neither purposeless nor chaotic; rather, all phenomena—even those that appear random—ultimately aim at a hidden telos. In this context, he highlights the role of the "accidental cause" (sabab bi-al-ʿaraḍ).



Focusing on Lahiji’s viewpoint, this article examines and critiques the philosophical debates surrounding the conceptualization of contingency. Adopting an analytical-logical approach, Lahiji first seeks to offer a precise definition of contingency and then explores its justificatory dimensions. He presents four distinct views on contingency, yet finds none of them adequate. Eventually, he turns to Avicenna’s approach to unpack the issue more thoroughly.



Following Avicenna, Lahiji explains contingency through the distinction between essential cause (sabab bi-al-dhāt) and accidental cause, and employs this distinction to resolve the conceptual problem. Drawing on illustrative examples—such as digging a well and unexpectedly finding treasure—this article analyzes the distinction between these two types of causality and their significance in explaining contingency from a philosophical standpoint.



Through this in-depth analysis of the concept of contingency, the article expands our philosophical understanding of final causality and the meaning of life, offering fertile ground for further research in this field.